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Intentional Islanding and Adaptive Load
Shedding to Avoid Cascading Outages
H. Manjari Dola, Student Member, IEEE

Abstract: Predetermined islanding scenarios along with
automated load shedding schemes are applied once a prospective
cascading outage condition is predicted. If required, additional
distributed generation at specified locations in the system is also
determined. The choice of different islands along with loads to be
shed is then made available to the operator so as to be armed for
action in case the system security is compromised. Determination
of line outages that lead to disastrous consequences, intentional
islanding schemes, and load shedding schemes have been
explored individually. A plan integrating these defense
mechanisms coupled with the possibility of using distributed
generation where and when available is presented via case
studies. Results obtained from the application of this technique
indicate that it can be a powerful approach for secure operation
of power systems.
Keyword: Catastrophic failure, blackout, countermeasures, load
shedding, distributed generation.
I. INTRODUCTION

S

YSTEM blackout is the state when the complete system or large
areas of it may completely collapse. This state is usually
preceded by a sequence of cascading failure events that knock
out transmission lines and generating units. Any large disruption in
generation and load balance in a massively interconnected system, as
seen in the North American interconnections, can lead to undesirable
variations in power flows and bus voltages. Occasionally, this
imbalance can spread uncontrollably over an entire system causing
blackout of large parts of the system. Although the reasons behind
blackouts can vary from instance to instance, certain themes are
evident from historically reported blackouts. Some of those deal with
the level of interconnection, transmission line capacities, proximity
of an event to major generation and loads, and how much power is
already moving across areas.
Major blackouts very often result in a condition when some
areas detach from the rest of the system causing power imbalance,
the subsystem is said to be islanded. To contain the cascading
outages several corrective and preventive schemes are being
discussed in the research community [1-3]. Some of the schemes
reported in the literature include system splitting strategies [4], slow
coherency-based islanding [5] and various load shedding schemesundervoltage load shedding (UVLS) [6], under-frequency load
shedding (UFLS) [7]. Yet, because of lack of pre-planned separation
of the system, absence of fast control measures, inadequate planning
and operation studies for emergencies and other events that are near
impossible to predict are the reasons blackouts continue to occur.
This paper introduces some blackout mitigation techniques that
are based on simple rules, such as, strategic tripping of overloaded
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lines near the initial failure, followed by rational load shedding. In
some cases, when load shedding does not help solve the problem,
premeditated islanding is carried out. The removal of small amounts
of loads tends to isolate the failure and prevent it from spreading.
This prevents additional lines from becoming overloaded, thus
helping avoid further outages.
The existing imbalance between generation capacity and
transmission capacity together with percentage loading of lines,
percentage loading of generators, voltage levels and interchange
level are major contributors to cascading failures. This paper
enumerates, by case studies, methods to seize a cascading failure as
soon as the initiating event can be identified. The methodology
consists of exploring the use of predetermined islanding scenarios
along with automated load shedding schemes. If required, additional
distributed generation at specified locations in the system is also
determined. The choice of island boundaries along with specific
loads and the amount to be shed is then made available to the
operator. A plan outlining the integration of all the three defense
mechanisms is also provided.
A. Cascading Failure - Blackout
Large blackouts are usually the outcome of cascading outages.
In a typical scenario, the disturbance spreads quickly because of
protective relays installed at critical nodes disconnected the key
components in an attempt to isolate the damage. Other factors such
as failure to trim trees under power lines, failing to rectify line sags
and so on contributed to initiate the documented blackouts. Table 1
gives a summary of the blackouts occurred in North America over
the years.
TABLE 1. MAJOR NORTH AMERICAN BLACKOUTS [8]
Date
Location
Load Interrupted
November 9, 1965
Northeast
20,000 MW
July 13, 1977
New York
6,000 MW
December 22, 1982
West Coast
12,350 MW
January 17, 1994
California
7,500 MW
December 14, 1994
Western US
9,336 MW
July 2, 1996
Western US
11,743 MW
August 10, 1996
Western US
30,489 MW
June 25, 1998
Midwest
950 MW
August 14, 2003
Northeast
61,800 MW

II. POWER SYSTEM SECURITY – ASSESSMENT AND DEFENSE SCHEMES
Security of a power system refers to the degree of risk in its
ability to survive imminent disturbances (contingencies) without
interruption of customer service. It relates to robustness of the system
to imminent disturbances and, hence, depends on the system
operating condition as well as the contingent probability of
disturbances [9].
A widely applied security assessment is contingency analysis.
System analysis gives information about the oncoming tribulations.
Pertinent up-to-date information on the system conditions can be

2

readily available to the system operator. This information is the
outcome of offline system studies with real time network data.
The most common defense schemes devoted to circumventing
wide-area disturbances are under-voltage load shedding, underfrequency load shedding, system separation (islanding), etc.
A. Islanding
As often seen, sometimes, during a disturbance, the system
tends to break up into islands. This occurs on account of the tripping
measures adopted by the grid’s protective systems. Undervoltages
created in such situations aggravate the existing condition and lead to
individual island failures. Unintentional or natural islanding has the
potential to damage equipment and compromise system security [4].
On the other hand, to prevent system failure during extreme
emergencies, it is sometimes recommended to execute controlled
splitting of the system into stable islands with generation and/or load
shedding using special protection schemes. Controlled islands are
more stable than the unintentionally formed islands. They are also
less prone to collapse and do not aggravate existing conditions that
lead to blackouts. However, these islands may still suffer from
generation-load imbalances. To eliminate undesired consequences of
a power imbalance, load or generation shedding is executed. The
islanded areas can be pre-planned, and specified by offline studies.
B. Distributed Generation
Distributed generation has the potential to improve the
reliability of the power system. It can reduce the need for new
transmission lines. It can also be configured to meet the varying
power demands. Distributed generation is usually either conventional
or renewable. They are usually located close to the customer load.
With careful planning and wise-spread adoption distributed
generation can help stabilize the system and sometimes prevent
blackouts. It can play a vital role in maintaining the generation-load
balance in intentional islanding schemes by ensuring that each area is
balanced. However, an oft-mentioned disadvantage of distributed
generation is that it may not be available at the desired locations.
C. Load Shedding

components are related, a disturbance can cause either a local
interruption or create widespread cascading actions. This
consequence is unpredictable and requires regular and systematic
system analysis to keep the operator aware of any limitation or
system stresses. For this study, a set of contingencies were preselected as reported in the companion paper [14].

B. Determining Pre-Disturbance Island Boundaries
Defining island boundaries just prior to an impending
disturbance is not possible since the disturbance cannot be predicted.
However, some island boundaries may be loosely defined based on
continuously monitoring the line flows and calculating the line
outage distribution factors (LODF). The transmission lines which are
near capacity have the tendency to trip during system disturbances.
These lines are closely observed while conducting load flow studies
and contingency analysis. Such lines together with geographical
aspects of the grid are taken into consideration while selecting island
ties.
The islands formed are assessed for independent operation.
Some islands may not be able to survive independently, inducing the
requirement for load/generation shedding or undervoltage load
shedding. To preserve the power balance, additional power in the
form of distributed generation may be required.
Fig. 1 illustrates the basic steps involved in developing the
projected technique. System data for a critical line outage condition
is studied for line overloads and bus undervoltages. Voltages and line
flows are the foremost indicators of system conditions.
Depending on system studies, a self-healing scheme and/or a
practical strategy may be deployed. This practical strategy includes
the islanding boundary definition and/or the self-healing scheme
which includes load/generation shedding and additional generation.

C. Determining the location and amount of load shedding
An exhaustive search is engaged to determine the loads required
to be shed to return the system to its nominal operating condition.
Although load shedding is considered as the last resort; it is a method
of reducing the load to restore the system power balance.

Load shedding is sometimes executed to reduce the imbalance
and reestablish the normal operating conditions in time to avoid
system collapse. Under normal and unexpected emergency
conditions voltage levels are maintained by undervoltage load
shedding (UVLS). By identifying the weakest nodes in the system,
the quantity and location of loads to shed is determined. Load
shedding is an effective low cost measure to maintain normal
operation during emergency conditions.

System
Information

Failure
Analysis

System
Assessment

III. METHODOLOGY
A technique to predict and quickly analyze effective defense
mechanisms following the outage of critical lines is presented in this
paper. System studies can provide information on lines that are at or
near capacity, lightly loaded lines and undervoltages/overvoltages.
Potential line outages that may cause cascading outages are also
analyzed by executing contingency analysis. The weaker areas of the
system are then defined, a list of weak nodes is prepared, and
probable island ties are devised. A simple and practical load shedding
scheme for a reliable island operation is also formulated.

A. Selection of the Initiating Disturbance
Large blackouts are the common outcome of cascading outages
in a power system. Uncontrolled cascading events are initiated by the
loss of major transmission lines, as observed in both the 1996 [10,
11] and the 2003 blackouts [12, 13]. Depending on how the system

Self-healing
Strategy

Strategy
Deployment

Fig. 1. The basic steps in the methodology

Determining the amount of load that needs to be shed is the
chief problem involved. The critical event leading to an extensive
cascading failure in Ohio and beyond during the August 2003
blackout, was the tripping a single line Sammis-Star 345-kV line
[12]. The tripping was executed as a defensive measure against line
overload and undervoltage at the buses. That and the similar tripping
of a few other lines resulted in an unavoidable system blackout. The
Task Force Report [13] concludes that load shedding, prior to the
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critical tripping of the Sammis line, would have helped to contain the
problem and prevented the system collapse.
Many methodologies have been proposed to ascertain the
amount of load that is appropriate to shed under given conditions.
Shedding load more than that required may create overvoltages or
aggravate the existing situation. Similarly, tripping less amount of
load will defeat the purpose and be ineffective in preventing
cascading outages.
By calculating the power drawn by the load before and after the
line outage the amount to be shed can be determined. This design is
developed taking into account the predetermined critical line outage
and island boundaries.
The location where the load is to be shed is a key factor that
should be considered. For example, if the loss of a critical line causes
an overload on a neighboring line, then the load connected at one of
the ends of the line is considered first. Shedding applied to any of
the neighboring buses by a percentage varying from 25% to 100%,
may help relieve the overload. The objective is to avoid a system
blackout which is achieved by implementing shedding schemes.
Load shedding is not generally recommended except during critical
conditions, such as critical contingencies.

selected using the same technique as load shedding. If the system
consists of lines which are near capacity or have low maximum flow
limits then it may require both load shedding and additional
generation to restore the system. The addition of generation to the
system is explained as an extension of this scheme. Fig. 3 depicts the
steps involved. The algorithm given in the figure is used to determine
if reducing generation alleviates the crisis, how much generation
needs to be decreased and at which bus it is to be applied.
E. Optimal Scheme
Alternative schemes deal with achieving system reliable
operation without the execution of island formation. For some system
conditions, by adding generation at certain buses and/or shedding
loads or generation can restore the system to its operable condition.
Vulnerability
Assessment

Critical Line
Contingency

D. Design Procedure
Since protecting the system against all possible contingencies is
evidently impractical, the fundamental principle is to secure the
system against only the critical contingencies. The analyses will
assess bus voltages and line loadings against specified system
constraints. The defense technique comprises of the following:

Violations: Line
Overloads and/or
Undervoltages/
Overvoltages?

(1) System power flow studies.
(2) Contingency analyses.
(3) Diverse islanding scenarios for predetermined disturbances.
(4) Load shedding schemes based on overloads and undervoltages.
(5) Additional generation initiated at selected buses.
For a reliable operation, the constraints that need to be satisfied,
after the defense scheme has returned the system from an emergency
condition to an operating state, are:
(1) System bus voltages should remain within limits.
(2) Line flows must not exceed the line’s maximum loading limit.
(3) Number of loads sheds should be minimum.
(4) Additional generation at a bus: less than 100MW.
(5) Adequate spinning reserves exist (7%-10%).
Fig. 2 outlines the steps and shows how the different protective
measures are incorporated together to generate the desired result, i.e.,
reliable system operation with lower level of security. System
operation with lower level of security implies that the system is
restored to an operable condition but may or may not be N-1 secure.
System security is compromised but operation is guaranteed. N-1
criterion ensures the secure and reliable operation of the power
system. It means that the system will operate normally and that the
power is delivered reliably even when one of the lines is lost.
The load-generation power balance gives an evaluation of the
system condition. If the total generation is greater than the total load,
then the system is in a power surplus situation. In this state, shedding
the generation will help rectify the problem. Surplus power in any
system may cause overvoltages or line overloads. But, if the system
is deficient in power, then either loads need to be shed or additional
generation should be brought in.
If load shedding does not relieve the undervoltages or line
overloads, then additional generation between the ranges of 25 MW
to 100 MW is applied. The bus, at which generation is installed, is

No

Stop

Yes

Load/generation
shedding, UVLS,
Additional
Generation
Placement

Islanding

Load/generation
shedding, UVLS,
Additional
Generation
Placement

Reliable System
Operation

Fig. 2. Overview of the procedure

The algorithm sketched out in Fig. 4 is self explanatory, where
it describes the load shedding scheme devised to eliminate system
violations. The shedding scheme developed is a simple yet efficient
way to combat the causes that create critical conditions in the system.
If adding a generator helps resolve the problem, it must be
limited to less than 100 MW at a bus. If the generation deficiency is
100 MW, then this amount is split up and spread out to other buses to
accommodate the constraint. It may not be possible to have the
required amount of distributed generation at hand. In such cases, load
shedding is employed to help the situation.
Even if the system is islanded into smaller areas, the scheme
described in Fig. 4 for load shedding does not need any
modifications. Load flow studies are conducted several times in this
scheme to ensure that the system is evaluated thoroughly.
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System
Constraints
violated?

System
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required
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Yes
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No

Yes

UV= 0? OV= 0?
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Yes

Reliable system
operation

Reliable system
operation

No
i= 1,
g= 1,
N= # of buses

No

No

i= 1,
g= 1
N= total# of buses

i= i+1

Pgen(i)= 0?
Yes

No

No

g= g+1
Yes

i= i+1

Pgen(i) ~=0?

Pgen(i)= 0.25*i

i= N?
Run load flow
study

i= i+1
g= 4?

Yes

No

Yes

Run load flow
study

No

Yes

i= i+1

# of violations
reduced?
Yes

Data reset to
previous system
conditions

Apply load
shedding
Yes

i= N?
g= g+1

# of violations = 0?

Pgen(i)= Pgen(i)*0.25*i

UV= 0?

No

No

No

g= 4?

Loadgeneration
balanced?

Yes

Reliable system
operation
Yes

B= BN?

No

No

B= B+1

Data reset to
previous system
conditions

g= g+1
No
Data reset to
previous system
conditions

Load(B)=0?

The final outputs of this technique are independent islands
capable of operating under reduced generation or load conditions for
each of the critical line outages. This scheme is verified using the
118-bus test system.

Overloaded line
detail list=BOL,
BN=Length(BO
L), B=1, G=1

P(B)=P(B)*0.1*g
Q(B)=Q(B)*0.1*g
IF Genp(B)<0 then
GenP(B)=GenP(B)*0.1*g

Yes

Run load flow
study

g= 10?

Fig. 3. Generation addition/reduction algorithm

After the procedure is set with various island cases, it is checked
for system reliability. If the islands cannot survive independently due
to system constraint violations, then a load shedding scheme is
applied to lead the islands to nominal operating conditions. Each
island scenario for the specified outage is considered and analyzed.

No

Yes

Yes

Intentional Islanding to Avoid Cascading Outages
Intentional, forced or controlled islanding is probably the best
venture put together for tackling emergency conditions. The data of
island boundaries is then used to provide information to the system to
implement the exact island condition in the system. Flowchart for the
proposed scheme to prevent system blackouts due to cascading
blackouts is given in Fig. 5.

OL= 0?

Undervoltage affected
bus list=BUV, BN=
Length(BUV), B=1, g=1

Yes

No

Yes

# of violations= 0?
No

# of violations
reduced?

No

Yes

Yes
Reliable system
operation

Fig. 4. Load shedding and additional generation placement algorithm (OL =
line overloads, UV = undervoltages, OV = overvoltages)

IV. TEST RESULTS
A. System diagram and operating conditions
The IEEE 118 bus test system, shown in Fig. 6 is used for
testing the cascading outage schemes. Four principle areas are
defined in the system as shown in the diagram. The 4 areas constitute
the natural pre-disturbance islands. These pre-defined island
boundaries are used to determine similar island boundaries during
critical cascading circumstances. There are 118 buses, 186 lines with
bus 65 being the swing bus. Island boundaries were predetermined
based on the procedure outlined in an earlier section. The criteria
used for determination of these islands were:
(1) Generation-load balance
(2) System bus voltages should remain within limits
(3) Line flows must not exceed loading limit.
(4) The number of loads shed should be less than 5
(5) Additional generation at a bus should be less than 100 MW
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Predetermined set
of islanding
schemes for
critical outage = [ ]

N= # of
different
schemes

TABLE 2 PRE-DETERMINED ISLAND TIES

Islands

Area 1

Area 1

-

Area 2

Apply load/
generation
shedding and/or
add generation
No

i= N?

No

Islands in operating in
reliable conditions?

Yes

Yes
Stop

Fig. 5. Flowchart of Proposed Scheme

The areas and the different tie lines are listed in Table 2. The
area ties are predominantly heavily loaded lines, making them
excellent candidates for island boundaries. During system outages or
disturbances, these lines may violate their limits, causing them to
trip. By defining them as the island ties, forced outage of these lines
as a mitigation measure is in fact conducive to the situation. In the
process of islanding, loss of these ties may cause overloads on other
lines.
B. Critical Contingencies
Owing to the large size of the power grid, numerous
contingencies have to be assessed. Out of these, only a handful can
create worst case scenarios. A total of 13 critical contingencies were
identified which could potentially result in cascading outages,
leading to a system blackout in each case [14]. Out of these, only five
are shown in this paper for reasons of brevity. Detailed system
analysis has shown that cascading failures were triggered by one of
these single outages eventually capable of producing a sequence of
events leading to system-wide failures. Blackout mitigation schemes
are tested for these five critical contingencies.

Area 4

24 - 70;
24 - 72

-

47 - 69;
49 - 67;
65 - 68

47 - 69;
49 - 67;
65 - 68

-

Area 3

24 - 70;
24 - 72

Area 4

-

-

Apply scheme(i)

Run load flow
study

Area 3

-

i= 1

i= i+1

37
43; 37 39; 37 40; 38 65

Area 2
34 - 43,
37 - 39;
37 - 40;
38 - 65

92 - 100;
92 - 102;
94 - 100;
98 - 100;
99 - 100

-

92 - 100;
92 - 102;
94 - 100;
98 - 100;
99 - 100
-

C. Case 1 – Outage of Line 4-5
This outage falls in Area-1 of the 118-bus test system and it is a
line component with a loading of over 75%. Loss of this power path
will require the neighboring lines to adjust and provide
compensations as shown in Fig. 7. Large amounts of power was
being transferred from bus 5 to bus 4 to serve the loads in this area.
This power is supplied predominantly by the large generators at
buses 10 and 26. The power that was being fed by line 4-5 to the load
is now shared by lines 3-5, 5-6, 5-11, 6-7 and 7-12.
Under pre-disturbance conditions line 5-11 was loaded to 67%
of its maximum capacity. But losing line 4-5, - a heavily loaded line;
overloads line 5-11 to about 120%. This can cause the line to be
tripped out by relaying equipment, initiating a sequence of cascading
events leading to a possible system blackout.
Appropriate islanding scenarios, load shedding and additional
generation are executed to thwart the cascading failure and
eliminating the overload on line 5-11 in its course. Load shedding
and placement of the required additional generation is determined by
the proposed scheme described earlier. Table 3 illustrates the
different schemes adopted to avoid a probable blackout condition,
bringing the system to an operable condition without any system
constraint violations. Scheme-1 operates the system in an islanded
condition. There are two islands formed which are capable of
operating independently with the help of additional generation and
load shedding.
For Area-1, generation is added at bus 11 to alleviate the
overload on 5-11, and the load at bus 36 is dropped. Disconnecting
the island ties for the formation of the two areas create undervoltages
at buses 36 and 38. Clearly, Scheme-2 is the superior alternative. It
requires additional generation of 75 MW at bus 11 without
instigating any island configuration.
No load shedding is required in this case. Turning on generation
of 75 MW in the form of distributed generation is feasible. Other
alternatives include schemes 3 and 4, where only load shedding (i.e.,
without the application of additional generation) is employed. Since,
there is no assurance that distributed generation will be available at
all times, it is essential to explore such cases.
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Fig. 6. The 118-bus test system.

D. Case 2 – Outage of transformer 37-38
Losing a transformer can cause severe violations. It creates
numerous undervoltages in Area-1 and Area-2. The power that is
being distributed by this transformer is fed to the loads at buses 33,
34, 35, 39and 40. As shown in Fig. 8, this transformer carries power
from the large generators at buses 10, 26 and 65.
Therefore, outage of this transformer causes undervoltages at
buses 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 43. Undervoltages are partially due to
the insufficiency of reactive power flow, requiring the need for
supplemental generation. Overloads on lines 15-33, 19-34, 40-42 and
43-44 is the result of a division of the flow distribution. Line 15-33 is
the overloaded the most since it has to provide the lost power to the
load at bus 33. The only other line initially providing power to this
load was 33-37 through 37-38.
Table 4 lists the different schemes to keep the system operating
at reliable conditions. Either by shedding a load and/or adding
generation at 33 and 34 facilitates operable conditions in the system.
Depending on the circumstances, either of the schemes can be
selected by the operator.

Fig. 7. Line 4-5 Outage
TABLE 3. MITIGATION SCHEMES FOR LINE OUTAGE: 4-5

Scheme
(#)
1
1
2
3
4
4

Details of the
Scheme
Island 1- Area 1
Island 2- Area 2-3-4
Entire System
Entire System
Island 1- Area 1
Island 2- Area 2-3-4

Loads
Shed
1
0
0
1
3
1

Gen
Added
75 MW
50 MW
75 MW
-

TABLE 4. MITIGATION SCHEMES FOR LINE OUTAGE: 37-38

Scheme
(#)
1
2

Details of the
Scheme
Entire System
Entire System

Loads
Shed
1
2

Gen
Added
50 MW
-

E. Case 3 – Outage of line 38-65
This line is a tie-line for Area-1 and Area-2 and carries large
amounts of power with a percentage loading of 65 %. It supplies
power to Area-1 from where it is distributed out to supply the load
demands in Areas 1 and 2. Outage of this line causes several line
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overloads without considerable voltage fluctuations, clearly shown in
Fig. 9. Both the areas suffer the consequences of the outage.

F. Case 4 – Outage of line 64-65
The line is located in Area-2, and has a percentage loading of
66%, distributing power through transformers to loads at buses 56,
57, 62, 66, and 67 as shown in Fig. 10.
The overloads on lines 62-66, 62-67 and 66-67 are the result of
the line outage taking away the path for power flow to supply the
demand. As listed in the Table 6, the various schemes are able to
restore operable condition to the system. Scheme 1, where islanding
is not an option, an additional generation of 50 MW each is required
at four buses (39, 55, 60 and 62). The distribution of additional
generation is executed to in this fashion supply the maximum power
possible to the load without causing any line overloads. Employing
load shedding exclusively is advised in the case of absence of
distributed generation in this area.

Fig. 8. Line 37-38 Outage

Fig. 10. Line 64-65 Outage
TABLE 6. MITIGATION SCHEMES FOR LINE OUTAGE: 64-65

Scheme
(#)

Details of the
Scheme

1
2*
2*

Entire System
Island 1- Area 2
Island 2- Area 13-4
Entire System

Fig. 9. Line 38-65 Outage

Inadequate maintenance of power supply among the load buses
is the reason for the overloads. This is alleviated by providing extra
generation at two buses; generation of 50 MW at buses 1 and 2 each.
Since buses 1 and 2 are further away from the point of outage, they
are not selected. Additional generation of 25 MW in Area-1 is
desired for this scheme. Scheme 2 is evidently the better choice as
seen from Table 5, even though it requires islanding the system into
two areas.
TABLE 5. MITIGATION SCHEMES FOR LINE OUTAGE: 38-65

Scheme
(#)
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5

Details of the
Scheme
Entire System
Island 1- Area 1-2
Island 2- Area 3-4
Entire System
Island 1- Area 1
Island 2-Area 2-34
Island 1- Area 1-2
Island 2- Area 3-4

Loads
Shed
0
0
0
3
1
1
3
0

Gen
Added
100 MW
25 MW
0
-

3

Loads
Shed
0
1
2
2

Gen
Added
200 MW
-

Scheme 2* involves islands of Area-1 and Area 2-3-4, but the
island boundaries have been modified to help the situation. Since the
outage involves a generator bus, designated as the slack bus, more
than four loads need to be shed to help the situation. Since the outage
involves a generator bus, designated as the slack bus, more than four
loads need to be shed to help the situation. In order to avoid this,
Area-1 boundaries have been changed from the original case which
included buses 1 - 38 to the modified case that included buses 1 - 42.
The part of the system consisting of buses 39 to 42 have been known
to create overloads due to the insufficient generation. This helps to
reduce the number of loads shed in Area 2-3-4.
G. Case 5 – Outage of line 89-92
This is a line in Area-3 which carries huge amounts of power
since bus 89 is connected to the largest generator in the entire
system. The outage of line 89-92 creates the most number of
overloads when compared to the other contingencies. This is due to
shortage of paths to serve the loads available in this part of the
system. Area-3 consists of numerous heavy loads making it a highly
volatile area with the incidence of a contingency, as shown in Fig.
11.
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As Area-3 harbors numerous loads, it is apparent that additional
generation might be needed to keep the system from plunging into a
blackout. In order to relieve the lines from overloading, generation of
50 MW at each of the buses 82, 92 and 93 is recommended. Table 7
lists the different schemes considered for this outage.

The final outputs of this technique are independent islands
capable of operating under reduced generation or load conditions for
each of the critical line outages. This study takes a step toward
proving that most cascading failures are avoidable but at some cost.
Although, load shedding works effectively in most cases, intentional
islanding helps in many cases to save the system from completely
collapsing.
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1
2
3
3
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